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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
THE ROLE OF OUTSIDERS IN UNION ELECTIONS:
United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski
I
BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES

A. Introduction
Article V, section 27, of the Constitution of the United Steelworkers
of America (USWA) prohibits a candidate for a major union office 1
from receiving campaign contributions from any person not a member
of the union. 2 In United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski 3 the Supreme Court upheld section 27 as a reasonable limitation on the freedom of speech and
assembly rights guaranteed in section 101(a)(2) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) .4 The opinion rested in
part on the Court's recognition that unions have a legitimate right to
5
limit outsiders from unduly influencing union affairs.
The Court's acceptance of the USWA's outsider rule is unfortunate.
Broad restrictions on outsider contributions to union political campaigns should be declared invalid. 6 The legislative history of the
LMRDA and the political realities of union election campaigns demand
no less. Although the Court's aversion to outsider infiltration of unions
1 Section 27 applies only to candidates running for a major office in the International
Union. The rule does not apply to candidates running for office in local or regional elections.
2 "No candidate. . . for any position. . . and supporter of a candidate may solicit or
accept financial support, or any other direct or indirect support of any kind . . . from any
non-member." UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA CONST. art. V, § 27 (adopted September 21, 1978).
3 457 U.S. 102 (1982).
4 Section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1976), reads:
Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and
assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or
opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon
candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business property before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing herein
shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and
enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the
organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would
interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.
5 457 U.S. at 112-19.
6 The ramifications of the Court's decision go far beyond the issue of union democracy
in the USWA. The decision is vitally important to the future of the labor movement as a
whole. The repressive provisions of § 27 are likely to be adopted by other unions where entrenched officials hold power.
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through excessive funding is a justifiable concern, various legislative and
judicial reforms are available that can both satisfy this concern and allow for needed outsider contributions.
B.

The Development of Section 27-A Look at Edward
Sadlowski's Political Past

The recent political campaigns waged by Edward Sadlowski played
a crucial role in the genesis of section 27. Sadlowski's political past typifies the unfairness inherent in USWA elections. As one commentator
stated, the USWA "centralized in haste and became legitimate at
7
leisure."
In 1973, Sadlowski ran against the retiring incumbent's handpicked
successor in a local district election." The union threw its resources behind the "incumbent" and Sadlowski was threatened with reprisals if he
did not withdraw. 9 Subsequently, reports of ballot stuffing and voting
fraud became widespread.10 After Sadlowski lost by a slim margin, a
new supervised election was ordered." Sadlowski won the second elec2
tion by a two-to-one margin.'
In 1976, Sadlowski challenged the "incumbents" for the national
union presidency.13 Sadlowski again faced a retiring incumbent's handpicked slate, which had the union's backing. Meanwhile, Sadlowski
struggled to accumulate a political campaign chest. 14 The source of
Sadlowski's financial support and the propriety of "outsider contributions" were hotly contested campaign issues. I5 Sadlowski was defeated
7
L. ULMAN, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STEELWORKERS UNION 3 (1962); cf.Brennan
v. United Steelworkers, 554 F.2d 586, 602-03 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 977 (1978);

J. HERLING,

RIGHT TO CHALLENGE (1972).

8 Brennan v. United Steelworkers, 554 F.2d 586, 590-91 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 977 (1978).
9 As one court noted: "The Union hierarchy, rather than remaining neutral and maintaining the integrity of the electoral process, closed ranks around its own candidate to prevent
an independent contender from gaining a foothold." Id at 608.
10 Early election returns gave Sadlowski a large lead. A complete tabulation, however,
took nearly three days. Id at 590.
11 After pursuing internal union channels to no avail, Sadlowski filed a timely complaint
with the U.S. Department of Labor. Upon completion of its Report of Investigation, the
Department of Labor instituted an action in the Western District of Pennsylvania to void the
election. Sadlowski intervened as a plaintiff and his own counsel played an active role in the
extensive pretrial proceedings. A new election was ordered as part of a settlement agreement.
The Department of Labor supervised the new election. Id at 590-91.
12 Id at 591.
13 James, Union Democrac and the LMRDA: Autocraty andInsurgency in National Union Elections, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 247, 344-51 (1978).
14 As ofJanuary 1977, Sadlowski reported that he had received $153,000, most of which
had come from outside the union. Id at 348.
15 See Note, Restrictions on "Outsider" Participationin Union Politics, 55 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
769, 770-72 (1979).
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by a vote of 328,861 to 249,281.16
The issue of outsider contributions remained a topic of debate in
the union following the election. The USWA administration proposed
section 27 as a solution to the "outsider" problem. At their 1978 biennial convention, the USWA enacted article V, section 27, as an amendment to the union constitution.' 7 Section 27 imposes a blanket
prohibition on campaign contributions by persons other than union
members. 18
C.

The Development of the Sadlowski Case

In late 1979, Sadlowski and others sued to challenge the validity of
the outsider rule.19 The plaintiffs asserted that the rule violated section
101(a)(2) of the LMRDA, the freedom of speech and assembly provision. 20 The incumbent leadership apparently promulgated the rule to
thwart expected challenges in the May 1981 elections. 2 1 The plaintiffs
claimed that although incumbents receive substantial campaign funds
from union staff members in patronage positions, insurgents do not have
access to the "political machine" and therefore must rely on outside contributions. The plaintiffs argued that the courts must "even" the polit16 Wall St. J., Apr. 25, 1977, at 12, col. 3. Sadlowski contested the validity of the election but the Secretary of Labor refused to take action. A legal challenge to the Secretary's
refusal also failed. See Sadlowski v. Marshall, 464 F. Supp. 858 (D.D.C. 1978), afdme., No.
79-146 (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 30, 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980).
17 UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA CONsT. art. V, § 27 (adopted Sept. 21, 1978).
18 Section 27 also empowers the International Executive Board to promulgate implementing regulations. The International Executive Board, pursuant to the authority vested in
it, promulgated several pages of regulations. The regulations prohibit, in sweeping language,
"the solicitation or acceptance of direct or indirect support from non-members. . . ." Regulations Under Article V, Section 27, of the USWA Constitution, § 2A, reprintedin Joint Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 493, United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102
(1982). Furthermore, the regulations require a candidate to record the name and local union
number of each contributor of more than one dollar. Id at § 3A, reprintedin Joint Appendix
to Petition for Certiorari at 495-96. The regulations also require disclosure to opponents and
union lawyers of the names of members who contribute $25 or more to a campaign. Id at
§ 4C, reprintedin Joint Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 498.
'9
Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers, 507 F. Supp. 623 (D.D.C.), qfd, 645 F.2d 1114
(D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd, 457 U.S. 102 (1982).
20 In addition to the alleged violations of § 101(a)(2), the suit filed in the district court
alleged violation of the first amendment of the United States Constitution by restricting
union members' freedom of association and speech; § 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 41 l(a) (4) (1976), by limiting union members' rights to sue; and § 401(g) of the LMRDA, 29
U.S.C. § 481(g) (1976), by exceeding the exclusive limitation that Congress placed on union
campaign financing. See Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers, 645 F.2d 1114, 1115 (D.C. Cir.
1981), rev'd, 457 U.S. 102 (1982).
The contention that the outsider rule violates § 101(a)(2) was first raised at the appellate
level before the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. Id at 1119-24.
21 One commentator called the outsider rule the "epilogue" of the bitterly fought 1977
election. See Note, supra note 15, at 791. Arguably, the outsider rule was promulgated by a
union establishment anxious to limit access to outside contributions by candidates for union
offices.
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ical balance by permitting outsider contributions. 22
The district court held that the outsider rule violated section
101(a)(4) of the LMRDA,23 the so called "right to sue" provision. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, but also
held that section 27 unreasonably impinges on the right of free speech
and assembly guaranteed by section 101(a) (2).24 The unanimous court
stated that "the outsider rule's blanket prohibition on outside contributions.. . flies squarely in the face of the intent of the LMRDA to 'insure union democracy.' '25 The court could not "conceive of anything
that would do more to inhibit union democracy than to prohibit insurgent candidates from receiving financial support from . . . outside
sources."

D.

26

The Supreme Court Decision in Sadowski

The Supreme Court reversed in a five-to-four decision, 27 holding
that the union's outsider rule did not violate section 101(a)(2) of the
LMRDA. The Court relied heavily on section 101(a) (2)'s proviso that
allows unions to adopt "reasonable" rules regarding members' responsibilities even if such rules interfere with the freedoms provided by other
portions of section 101(a)(2). 28 In deciding whether the outsider rule
was "reasonable," the Court looked to the policies underlying the
LMRDA.2 9 The union argued that it promulgated the rule to ensure
that nonmembers would not unduly influence union affairs. The Court
concluded that the policies and history underlying the LMRDA indicate that this was a legitimate and protected purpose and thus sustained
the rule as a reasonable interference with the freedoms afforded by sec30
tion 101(a)(2).
The Court acknowledged that the outsider rule may limit the ability of insurgent union members to wage an effective campaign against
22 See Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers, 507 F. Supp. 623 (D.D.C.), afd, 645 F.2d 1114
(D.C. Cir. 1981), reo'd, 457 U.S. 102, 113-14 (1982).
23 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1976).
24 See Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers, 645 F.2d 1114, 1119-25 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rez'd,
457 U.S. 102 (1982).
25 Id at 1122 (quoting S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1959); H.R. REP. No.
741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959)).
26 645 F.2d at 1123.
27 United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982).
28 Id at 111.
29

30

Id

The Union adopted the rule because it wanted to ensure that nonmembers do
not unduly influence union affairs. USWA feared that officers who received
campaign contributions from non-members might be beholden to those individuals and might allow their decisions to be influenced by considerations
other than the best interests of the Union.
Id. at 115.
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incumbent officers.3 ' The Court concluded, however, that the impact
on insurgents would not be substantial.
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that section 101(a)(2) required the same scope of protection that the first amendment affords in
public elections. Union rules need only be rational; they need not pass
32
the stringent tests applied in first amendment cases.
II
BROAD RESTRICTIONS ON OUTSIDER CONTRIBUTIONS
SHOULD BE DECLARED INVALID

Congress, in an effort to promote union democracy and provide
new candidates with the opportunity to effectively oppose incumbent
and often corrupt leadership,3 3 adopted section 101(a)(2) of the
LMRDA protecting free speech and assembly. The USWA's restrictions
on outside contributions would have a detrimental effect on an insurgent candidate's ability to criticize union policies and challenge union
leadership. Given the congressional intent to promote union democracy, it is unlikely that Congress would have allowed such a broad de31

Id at 112.
Id at 111.
Some commentators have argued that public forum principles of democracy are inapplicable to, and cannot fairly be imposed upon, unions. Paternalistic attempts to achieve
internal union democracy, these commentators contend, do more harm than good for the
individual worker because internal democracy weakens the union's ability to achieve its principal economic goals. These commentators rely on three basic arguments to justify the absence of internal union democracy. First, success in the union's economic endeavors requires
a unified, experienced force that has achieved a beneficial working relationship with management. Second, unions are organized for industrial conflict with nonunion groups. It is unfair
to impose burdens on unions when such burdens are not equally imposed on corporate structures. Third, union members as a group reflect a greater homogeneity of background and
interests-and hence have less basis for internal conflict-than do citizens of a state. See
Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 25, 52 n.97 (1960);
Magrath, Democrag in Overalls: The Futile Questfor Union Democra, 12 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 503 (1959).
The trend of opinion, however, has clearly been in favor of increasing union democracy.
See, e.g., S. LIPsET, M. TROW & J. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY 3-16 (1956) (case study of
International Typographical Union refuting "iron law of oligarchy"); Cox, Internal A lairs of
Labor Unions Under the LaborReform Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REv. 819, 830 (1960) (only democratic union can achieve "idealistic aspirations which justify labor organizations") [hereinafter cited as Cox, InternalAfairs]; see also Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72
HARV. L. REV. 609, 610 (1959). ("An individual worker gains no human rights by substituting an autocratic union officialdom for the tyranny of the boss. Only a democratic union,
sensitive to the rights of minorities, can help men to achieve the ideals of individual responsibility, equality of opportunity, and self-determination.") [hereinafter cited as Cox, Union Democracy]. See generally Hanslowe, supra, at 52 (restrictions on democratic functions in union
should be only to extent needed for union to carry out its bargaining function); Taylor &
Witney, Unionism in the American Society, 18 LABOR L.J. 286, 303 (1967) (union democracy in
context of racketeering and corruption).
Part II of this Note assumes that Congress has already resolved this question in favor of
greater union democracy by its enactment of the LMRDA.
32
33
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nial of financial support to insurgent candidates. The Court should
have declared these restrictions invalid.
A.

Section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA

The language of section 101(a)(2) provides little insight into congressional intent regarding outsider contributions. Professor Cox suggests that the LMRDA presents special problems for judicial
interpretation because it contains "calculated ambiguities or political
compromises essential to secure a majority." 34 As a result, Professor Cox
has recommended that, when interpreting the LMRDA, "courts would
be well advised to seek out the underlying rationale without placing
'35
great emphasis upon close construction of the words."
Professor Cox's insights are helpful in reviewing the legislative history and judicial interpretation of the LMRDA and section 101(a) (2).
From 1957 to 1960, the Senate's McClellan Committee 36 paraded before
the American public reports of corruption and racketeering within
union infrastructures.3 7 Increased public 38 and legislative attention led
to the enactment of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act in 1959. 39 The LMRDA was the first major attempt by Congress to
regulate the internal affairs of labor unions.40
34

Cox, Internal Affairs, supra note 33, at 852.

35
36

Id

The Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management
Field held investigatory hearings from 1957 to 1960 to study abuses in the labor field. The
Committee was popularly known as the McClellan Committee because it was chaired by
Senator John McClellan (D. Ark.). During its existence, the Committee held 270 days of
public hearings and amassed 46,150 pages of record. The Committee heard 1,526 witnesses
and issued 8,000 subpoenas. Three hundred forty-three witnesses declined to answer Committee inquiries by invoking the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. J. McCLELLAN, CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT 208 (1962).
37 See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 1139,86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); SENATE SELECT
COMM. ON IMPROPER ACTVmTIEs IN THE LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, SECOND INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. No. 621, 86th Cong.,'lst Sess. (1959); SENATE SELECT COMM. ON
IMPROPER ACTIVITIEs IN THE LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, INTERIM REPORT, S. REP.

No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958).
38 Arguably, the public alarm was sounded as early as 1943. In that year the American
Civil Liberties Union published a pamphlet detailing undemocratic procedures in trade unions. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS (1943). See general/, J. HUTCHINSON, THE IMPERFECT UNION (1970) (history of corruption in American
trade unions); R. KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN (1960) (autobiographical account of McClellan Committee by former chief counsel); P. TAFT, CORRUPTION AND RACKETEERING IN
THE LABOR MOVEMENT (2d ed. 1970).

39 Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976)) (commonly
referred to as Landrum-Griffin Act).
40 Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 530 (1972). See generally Aaron, The
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1960); Cox,
Intenal Afirs, supra note 33.
For analysis of pre-LMRDA regulation of internal union elections, see Aaron &
Komaroff, Statutoy Regulation of InternalUnion Affairs-, 44 ILL L. REV. 425, 461-62 (1949);
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In Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 4 1 the Supreme Court noted that
"Congress saw the principle of union democracy as one of the most important safeguards against. . . abuse [of power by union officials], and
accordingly included in the LMRDA a comprehensive scheme for the
regulation of union elections." ' 42 Union democracy was seen as the
means to combat entrenched, corrupt union leadership. Senator McClellan stated that the congressional goal was to end "autocratic rule by
placing the ultimate power in the hands of the members, where it rightfully belongs, so that they may be ruled by their free consent, may bring
about a regeneration of union leadership." 43 This congressional concern
resulted in a guarantee of the union member's right to run for election
in section 401(e), 44 and a guarantee of freedom of speech and assembly
45
in section 101(a)(2).
Cox, Union Democracy, supra note 33, at 609; Shade, The Problem of Union Corruptionand the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 19 5 9, 38 TEx. L. REv. 468, 484-85 (1960).
41
404 U.S. 528 (1972).
42
Id at 531. For further support of the LMRDA's emphasis on union democracy, see
Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers, 645 F.2d 1114, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd, 457 U.S. 102
(1982); S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959); H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1959). In Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 497
n.6 (1968), the Court quoted the following language from SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND
PUBLIC WELFARE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT

REPORTING AND DIscLOSURE ACT OF

1959, S.

REP. No. 187, 86 Cong., Ist Sess. 6-7, 20 (1959):
Like other American institutions some unions have become large and impersonal; they have acquired bureaucratic tendencies and characteristics; their
members like other Americans have sometimes become apathetic in the exercise of their personal responsibility for the conduct of union affairs ...
• . . [E]ffective measures to stamp out crime and corruption and guarantee internal union democracy, cannot be applied to all unions without the
coercive powers of governments ...
. . . Union members have a vital interest. .. in the policies and conduct
of union affairs. To the extent that union procedures are democratic they
permit the individual to share in the formulation of union policy. This is not
to say that in order to have democratically responsive unions, it is necessary to
have each union member make decisions on detail as in a New England town
meeting. What is required is the opportunity to influence policy and leadership by free and periodic elections.
It needs no argument to demonstrate the importance of free and democratic union elections. . . . The Government which gives unions. . . power
has an obligation to ensure that the officials who wield it are responsive to the
desires of the men and women whom they represent. The best assurance
which can be given is a legal guaranty of free and periodic elections. The
responsiveness of union officers to the will of the members depends upon the
frequency of elections, and an honest count of the ballots. Guarantees of fairness will preserve the confidence of the public and the members in the integrity of union elections.
See also Griffin, A New Era in Labor-ManagementRelations, in SYMPOSIUM LMRDA 25 (R.
Slovenko ed. 1961).
43
105 CONG. Rac. S6472 (1959), reprintedin 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DIsCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 1099 (1959).
44
29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1976).
45
29 U.S.C. §411(a)(2) (1976).
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted the LMRDA consistent with congressional concern for promotion of union democracy.
In Hall v. Cole, 46 the Court stated that title I "was specifically designed
to protect the union member's right to seek higher office within the
union. '4 7 In Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 48 the
Court stated that the abuses of "entrenched leadership" were to be controlled by the "check of democratic elections. '49 Finally, in Local 3489,
United Steelworkers v. Use 50° the Court demanded that these elections

were to be modeled on the "political elections in this country." 5 1
B.

Realities of Union Politics
Realities of union politics prompted congressional enactment of

safeguards to protect union democracy. 52 Years before the adoption of

the outsider rule, John Herling wrote that "[t]o challenge an entrenched
union president [has] long been considered one of the more daring if not
foolhardy exercises in labor politics." 53 An insurgent candidate "is op-

posed by the incumbent candidate plus the institution itself."'54 Unlike
the usual two-party system in public elections, which serves to equalize

electoral opportunities, unions typically have a one-party system with
46 412 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that union member who had been improperly expelled
from his union for introducing resolutions at general meeting alleging various undemocratic
actions and shortsighted policies on part of union officers was entitled to award of attorney's
fees in successful suit brought under § 102 of LMRDA).
47 Id at 14. The Court also stated:
In an effort to eliminate. . . abuses [by union leaders], Congress recognized
that it was imperative that all union members be guaranteed at least "mini" [105 CONG. REc. 6471 (1959)
mum standards of democratic process ....
(statement of Sen. McClellan).] Thus, Title I of the LMRDA-The "Bill of
Rights of Members of Labor Organizations"--was specifically designed to
promote the "full and active participation by the rank and file in the affairs of
the union," [American Fed'n of Musicians v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171, 182-83
(1964)] and, as the Court of Appeals noted, the rights enumerated in Title I
were deemed "vital to the independence of the membership and the effective
and fair operation of the union as the representative of its membership."
[Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777, 780 (2d Cir. 1972), afd, 412 U.S. 1 (1973).]
412 U.S. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
48 391 U.S. 492 (1968) (invalidating union bylaw that restricted eligibility for major
elective offices to members who held, or had previously held, elective office).
49 Id at 499.
50 429 U.S. 305 (1977) (invalidating union bylaw that restricted eligibility for local
union office to members who had attended at least one-half of regular meetings of local for
three years prior to election).
51 Id at 309 (quoting Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S.
492, 504 (1968)).
52
For case studies of insurgent challenges under the LMRDA, see, James, supra note 13,
at 325-51.
53
J. HERLING, RIGHT TO CHALLENGE 301 (1972).
54 James, supra note 13, at 270 (emphasis in original); see a/so J. EDELSTEIN & M.
WARNER, COMPARATIVE UNION DEMOCRACY 41 (1979) ("[T]he full facilities of the national
union, including the full-time field staff, are available for mobilisation [sic] against those oppositionists bold enough to try for elective office.").
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the incumbent officers controlling the only organization in existence. 55
As the Supreme Court noted in Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Use, 56
there is no "permanent 'opposition party'" in the USWA. 57 Consequently, a challenger must build an ad hoc campaign organization.
The one party system provides the incumbent with numerous benefits. 58 First, the incumbent hierarchy controls a paid staff that provides
both the backbone of a political organization and a ready source of
financial contributions. 59 The union staff often owe their jobs to a patronage system and must demonstrate their allegiance at election time.
Over a century ago, in Ex Parte Curtis,60 the Court recognized a similar
problem in a comparable public sector setting. The Court there addressed the concern that allowing public officials to solicit contributions
from other public employees might encourage those solicited to contribute only "to avoid a discharge from service, not to exercise a political
'6 1
privilege.
Second, the incumbent officers control the union newspapers,
which reach the homes of all union members. Articles praising the incumbent officers' accomplishments, while denigrating or ignoring insur62
gent forces, provide an unmistakeable advantage to incumbents.
Third, the incumbents have ready access to information about
members, including lists of members' names, addresses, and telephone
numbers. Although the law requires equal access to membership lists,63
obtaining this information from the incumbent administration may
64
prove difficult.
Fourth, the officers have access to legal services paid for by the
55

J.

56

429 U.S. 305 (1977).

57

Id

SEIDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN THE LABOR MOVEMENT 30 (2d ed. 1969).

at 310-11.

An institutionalized two-party system in labor unions is extremely rare. Some authorities claim that only one major labor organization, The International Typographical Union,
has maintained a two-party system. See S. LiPsEr, M. TROW &J. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOC-

(1956).
James, supra note 13, at 277.
59
Note, Union Electionsand the LMRDA: Thirteen Years of Use andAbuse, 81 YALE L.J. 407,
463-64 (1972).
60
106 U.S. 371 (1882).
61 Id at 374. For other cases limiting political activity by public employees, see United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 566-67 (1973)
(prohibition of partisan political activity by federal employees needed to prevent coercion by
superiors); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96-99 (1947) (prohibition of political activity promotes efficiency and good administration in public service by preventing promotion of personnel as result of political rather than official effort); United States v.
Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 398-99 (1930) (prohibition of contributions from public service employees to congressmen for political purposes is constitutional).
62 James, supra note 13, at 279-80; Seidman, Some Requirements for Union Democracy, in
LABOR: READINGS ON MAJOR ISSUES 164 (R. Lester ed. 1965).
63 See 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1976).
64 See Affidavit of Clyde W. Summers, reprintedin Joint Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 146, 153-54, United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982). Professor SumRACY

58
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union. Election violation challenges in the courts are extremely costly
65
and can be used to deplete an insurgent's campaign chest.
In attempting to neutralize the incumbent's numerous advantages,
an insurgent's greatest weakness is his lack of financial resources. Running for office in a union with 1.4 million members spread throughout
the United States and Canada requires substantial funding. The
Supreme Court has long recognized the positive correlation between
successful campaigning and the ability to solicit funds. In Buckley v.
Valeo, 66 a public forum case, the Court noted that a restriction on campaign spending "necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration,
67
and the size of the audience reached."
The insurgent faces a difficult time raising funds within the union.
The incumbent candidate controls the union disciplinary function and
many of the rank and file may fear reprisal for supporting an insurgent.
The union constitution often contains clauses that only vaguely define
the reasons for disciplinary action. These vague clauses can be used to
suppress opposition. 68 Similarly, the rank and file may fear that the
incumbents' power to allocate "work place benefits" will be disproportionately applied to reward supporters at the expense of insurgents.
These work place benefits include vigorous pursuit of grievances, news
of job openings, assistance in securing the most desirable of those openings, and trips to national conventions. 69 Moreover, union politics are
characterized by a low level of interest and participation except close to
70
election time, when emotional issues are on the agenda.
mers was one of the experts selected by then Senator John F. Kennedy to provide advice
during consideration of the legislation that ultimately became the LMRDA.
65 See id at 154, 158.
66 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
67
d at 19 (footnote omitted). The Court went on to state that "virtually every means
of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs.
Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event." Id
68 Professor Clyde Summers, in a study of union disciplinary provisions, found that 130
of 154 union constitutions contained provisions so vague that it was difficult to distinguish
between proper and improper behavior. See Summers, Disciplina Powers of Unions, 3 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REv. 483, 508 (1950); see also J. SEIDMAN, supra note 55, at 16-17, 42-43 (2d ed.
1969); cf Note, supra note 59, at 448-51 (Although "LMRDA provisions exist which substantially meet the problems of financial and physical coercion," protection from negative job
sanctions is only provision that courts are willing to strictly enforce).
69 See Note, supra note 59, at 445.
70 Opposition to incumbent leaders usually develops around particular issues and disappears when the issues are resolved or the personalities fade. See general'y A. COOK, UNION
DEMOCRACY: PRACTICE AND IDEAL (1963); M.

ESTEY, THE UNIONS (1967); UNIONS AND

(J. Barbash ed. 1959).
For more detailed analysis of rank and file interest and participation, see L. SAYLES & G.
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STRAUSS, THE LOCAL UNION (rev. ed. 1967); J. SEIDMAN, supra note 55; A. TANNENBAUM &
R. KAHN, PARTICIPATION IN UNION LOCALS (1958).
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In sharp contrast is the incumbent's ability to raise funds from
within the union. As stated, the incumbent has the traditional advan71
tage of access to "contributions" from persons on the union payroll.
This inherent disadvantage forces the insurgent to solicit funds from
outsiders. Thus, denying outside funding would deny a fair opportunity
to challenge the incumbent, and compromise the intent of the LMRDA.
III
THE THREAT OF OUTSIDE CONTRIBUTIONS-PREVENTING
ABUSE BY OUTSIDE ELEMENTS

In sum, broad limitations on outsider contributions constitute unreasonable restrictions of section 101(a)(2) rights.
Reading section
101(a)(2) expansively, however, and denying all restrictions on outsider
contributions, creates a risk that such contributions will be used to defeat the LMRDA's goal of union democracy; outside elements may use
contributions to finance their way into positions of power within a
union. This Note argues that Congress can impose reasonable limitations
on outsider contributions to avert this danger. The field of public elections provides models for these limitations. Such a solution is in keeping
with the Supreme Court's assertion that the congressional model for
union elections is the "political elections in this country. ' 72 Various reform measures based on public elections are available.
A.

Reporting and Disclosure

Congress has long recognized that the publication of the names of a
candidate's backers is an effective means of enabling voters to formulate
more informed opinions about the candidate. 73 Congress enacted the
first federal disclosure law in 1910,74 and substantially broadened disclosure requirements in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.75 In
71
For example, in the 1977 steelworker election, the incumbent slate relied almost exclusively on money from incumbent officers and staff. According to campaign-engendered
litigation records, approximately 90% of incumbent campaign contributions received during
late 1976 and early 1977 came from union officers and staff. Affidavit of Robert Haustman,
reprintedinJoint Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 173, Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers,
457 U.S. 102 (1982). Most of the district directors contributed at least $1000. Id. Other staff
members ordinarily donated $500 each and, in some USWA districts, every staff member
contributed an equal amount. Id at 173-74.
72
Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 309 (1977) (quoting Wirtz v.
Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 504 (1968)).
73
Mr. Justice Brandeis advised: "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social
• . .diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman." L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1933).
74
Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822. Political organizations operating to influence congressional elections in two or more states were required to disclose the names of all
contributors of $100 or more.
75
Ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 591, 597, 599 (1976)).
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upholding the 1925 Act, the Court stated that Congress had the power
"to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard . . .election[s] from the
'76
improper use of money to influence the result.
In 1971, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA). 77 Congressional leaders argued that timely exposure of the
source and size of each contribution could deter improper exchanges of
influence and special favors.78 In Buckle v. Valeo, 79 the Court concluded
that the Act's disclosure provisions8 ° did not violate constitutional safeguards.8 1 The Court reasoned that the importance of the governmental
interests that the disclosure requirements sought to vindicate out82
weighed the possibility of infringement on constitutional rights.
Congress has already incorporated certain reporting provisions in
the LMRDA. The LMRDA requires every labor organization to file
with the Secretary of Labor an annual financial report disclosing its receipts and disbursements together with the sources and purposes
thereof.83 These reports are available to union members, the press, and
the public. Furthermore, the LMRDA authorizes the Secretary of Labor, armed with the power to subpoena, to investigate the accuracy of
reports.84 Failure to file a report, or filing an intentionally false report,
85
is punishable by a fine or imprisonment.
Congress can create a disclosure system for union elections that
would require mandatory reporting of outside political contributions.
Existing public election disclosure regulations and present LMRDA reporting provisions can serve as useful models. By combining elements
from these two sources, Congress can develop a comprehensive system to
limit the "unwanted" side effects inherent in outside contributions.
76

Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934).
77 Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2,
18, 26, 42, 47 U.S.C. (1976, Supp. V 1981 & 1982). The Act was amended in 1974 to implement tougher standards. See Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974). This Act replaced all
prior disclosure laws.
78 See generaly H.R. REP. No. 564, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21-26 (1971).
79 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
80 The disclosure provisions required every "political committee" to register with the
Federal Election Commission, 2 U.S.C. § 433(a) (1976) (amended 1980), and to keep detailed
accounts of contributions and expenditures. Id § 433(c) (amended 1980). Committee records
had to disclose all persons donating more than $10, and persons contributing more than $100
were required to disclose their occupations and principle places of business. Id § 432(c)(2)
(amended 1976, 1980). The Committee had to file quarterly reports containing information
as to the names and addresses of contributors who had given more than $100. Id § 434(b)(2)
(amended 1980). Finally, all reports filed with the Commission had to be made "available for
public inspection and copying." Id § 438(a)(4) (amended 1980).
81 424 U.S. at 60-84.
82 Id at 66.
83 29 U.S.C. § 431(b) (1976).
84 Id §521 (1976).
85 Id § 439 (1976).
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Ceilings on Outsider Contributions

In Buckley v. Valeo, 8 6 the Court approved the FECA limitations8 7 on
the amount an individual can contribute to a candidate in public elections.8 8 The Court reasoned that the limitations imposed only a marginal restriction on first amendment freedoms. 8 9 The Court sought to
effectuate the FECA's primary purpose "to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial
contributions. "9

The FECA public election provisions are useful models for imposing ceiling limitations on outside contributions in union elections. Providing a ceiling in union elections would help prevent any one
individual or organization from gaining control of a candidate. Congress could amend the LMRDA disclosure provision 9i to require the Labor Department to actively scrutinize a candidate's contribution
records.
C.

Limiting the Union Staff

Union staffs serve as an incumbent's standing campaign organization as well as his major source of campaign funding. Congress could
direct legislative reform at limiting the inherent political imbalances
caused by the union staff.92 Congress can eliminate a major cause of
outsider influence on union elections by limiting an insurgent's need for
excessive outside funding. The Hatch Act, 93 applicable to lower level
federal employees and public elections, can serve as a useful model for
such action.
The Hatch Act forbids most federal employees of executive agencies 94 from giving or receiving any "thing of value for political purposes," 95 and prohibits them from "tak[ing] an active part in political
management or in political campaigns. '98 A similar statute might solve
86 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
87 The FECA prohibits any individual from giving any one candidate for federal office
more than $1,000 in any primary, run off, or general election and limits a contributor who
supports a number of candidates in various elections to an aggregate contribution of $25,000
per year. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1), (3) (Supp. IV 1980). Although the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976 repealed 18 U.S.C. § 608, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 201, 90 Stat.
475, 476 (1976), it included virtually identical provisions in 2 U.S.C. § 441(a) (1982).
88 424 U.S. at 143.
89 Id at 20-21.
90 Id at 26.
91 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
92 This concept has been discussed by other commentators, most recently in Comment,
Campaign FinancingofInternal Union Elections, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1094, 1124-26 (1980).
93 Ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18 U.S.C.).
94 The Act exempts from its coverage employees of executive agencies appointed by the
President.
95 5 U.S.C. § 7323 (1982).
96 Id § 7324(a)(2). For a full description of these prohibitions, see Esman, The Hatch
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many of the imbalances found in union elections. 9 7 Amendments to the
LMRDA could bar union staff members from partisan election activities. Congress could introduce policing provisions to provide for Labor
Department scrutiny upon substantial evidence of improper staff activity. Enforcement provisions could provide for fines or short-term jail
sentences.
D.

Institutionalized Funding and Reimbursement

Alternative funding methods, such as institutionalized funding and
reimbursement, can be used to lessen the influence of outsider contributions. These proposals, rather than monitoring and limiting outsider
contributions, are aimed at reducing a candidate's substantial reliance
on outside financing.
In Buckley v. Valeo, 98 the Court approved the federal system for institutionalized funding in public elections. 99 The Court held that the provisions for public funding of presidential elections are "a congressional
effort, not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public
money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in
°
the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people."'
Applying institutionalized funding to the labor setting requires,
first, developing a fund, and second, determining which candidates
Act-A Reappraisal, 60 YALE L.J. 986, 990-91 (1951); Friedman & Klinger, The Hatch Act:
Regulation by Administrative Action of PoliticalActivities of Governmental Employees (pts. 1 & 2), 7
FED. B.J. 5, 138 (1945-1946).
97 The goals of the Hatch Act are strikingly similar to the reforms needed in labor union
politics. In United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548 (1973), the Court stated:
[P]erhaps the immediate occasion for enactment of the Hatch Act in
1939 ... was the conviction that the rapidly expanding Government work
force should not be employed to build a powerful, invincible, and perhaps
corrupt political machine. [E]xperience . . .convinced Congress that these
dangers were sufficiently real that substantial barriers should be raised against
the party in power-or the party out of power, for that matter-using the
thousands or hundreds of thousands of federal employees . . . to man its
political structure and political campaigns.
Id at 565-66 (citations omitted).

98

424 U.S. 1 (1976).

99 See I.R.C. §§ 6096, 9001-9013, 9031-9042 (1976). These sections authorize the provision of subsidies from a special fund to eligible candidates in United States presidential
primaries and elections. The financing of the fund comes from general revenues in the aggregate amount designated by individual taxpayers. Taxpayers may authorize payment to the
fund of one dollar of their tax liability. See id §§ 6096, 9006 (1976).
100 424 U.S. at 92-93. Subsidized funding in public elections has received considerable
attention from commentators. See Agree, PublicFnancing After the Supreme Court Decision, 425
ANNALS 134 (1976); Barrow, Regulation of Campaign Funding and Spendingfor FederalOffe, 5 U.
MIcH. J.L. REF. 159 (1972); Biden, Public Financingof Elections: Legislative Proposalsand Constitutional Questions, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1974); Fleischman, Public Financing of Election Campaig: ConstitutionalConstraintson Steps TowardEqualily of PoliticalIn/luence of Citi-ens, 52 N.C.L.
REV. 349 (1973); Nicholson, Campaign Financing and Equal Protection, 26 STAN. L. REV. 815
(1976) (equal protection analysis of campaign financing).
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should qualify for support. A fund can be developed from union
dues."° A certain portion of each member's yearly dues requirement,
02
perhaps one dollar or fifty cents, could be used to create the fund.
Other possible sources for such a fund would be a special tax on unions
or present government revenues.
Access to the fund would be limited to viable candidates. For example, a candidate would provide a bona fide list of rank and file sup03
porters' signatures before receiving funding.
Another potential funding scheme can be derived from the corporate context. Courts have used a "common benefit" theory to hold successful insurgents entitled to reimbursement by the corporation after a
proxy fight.' 0 4 Funding for reimbursement comes from corporate assets
and requires a showing of reasonable and bona fide expenses incurred in
0
the proxy contest.

5

Arguably, the courts have already applied the "common benefit"
theory in labor law suits. In LMRDA section 102 suits, 0 6 the courts
have allowed union payments of a member's attorney fees. 10 7 Applica101 See Cloke, Mandatogy PoliticalContributionsand Union Democracy, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 527
(1981) (arguing that unions should be allowed to compel members to pay dues to be used for
legislative and other political activities).
102 In a union as large as the USWA, with a membership of over one million, a set-aside
of less than one dollar per member would probably be ample to cover campaign costs.
103 For example, the signatures of 30% of the bargaining unit might be required to qualify for funding. The 30% figure might be high enough to ensure the serious attraction of a
candidacy, without being too rigorously exclusive. The legislature could, of course, increase
or decrease the requisite percentage. Compare the National Labor Relations Board's use of a
30% signature requirement for considering a union petition for a representation election. See
R. GORMAN, BASIc TEXT ON LABOR LAw 41 (1976).
104 See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291
(1955) (reimbursement of successful insurgent upheld in derivative suit for return of corporate
funds awarded after majority vote of shareholders); Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604, 60708 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (successful insurgents, having rid corporation of policies "frowned upon
by a majority of stockholders," were entitled to reimbursement upon approval by majority of
stockholders).
Some commentators have argued that unsuccessful insurgents also deserve reimbursement under a "common benefit" theory. See, e.g., E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 575-77 (2d ed. 1968); Friedman, Expenses of CorporateProxy
Contests, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 951 (1951); Note, Proxy Solicitation Costs and Corporate Control, 61
YALE LJ. 229 (1952); Comment, Proxy Contests: CorporateReimbursement of Insurgents' Expenses,
23 U. CHI. L. REV. 682 (1956). But see Note, Corporations: Reimbursementfor Corporate Campaign
Expenses Incurredin Proxy Fights, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 893, 903 (1955) (reimbursement of losing
insurgents may be questionable); Note, Corporations:Proxy Solicitationandthe Payment of Expenses
Incurredby Insurgent Shareholders Out of CorporationFunds, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 558, 564 (1951) (no
legal basis for reimbursing even successful insurgents).
105
Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 172, 128 N.E.2d 291,
292 (1955).
106 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1976).
107 See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 8 (1973); f Brennan v. United Steelworkers, 554
F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1977) (insurgent candidate who intervened in Secretary of Labor's suit to
overturn election may be entitled to attorney fees under "common benefit" rule), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 977 (1978).
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tion of the theory to election proceedings and campaign expenses is not
an unreasonable extension of these established precedents.
Reimbursement may not be an effective measure, however, when
compared with other reform proposals. Funding received after the campaign would not provide the necessary financial impetus to mobilize an
insurgent challenge. Further, an insurgent may not risk a campaign if
only successful candidates receive reimbursement. Perhaps unsuccessful
candidates also deserve reimbursement. 108
CONCLUSION

The debate over outsider contributions in union political campaigns focuses on two opposing policy issues. On the one hand, outside
contributions are needed to correct the political imbalance between an
incumbent and an insurgent slate. On the other hand, outside contributions may threaten unwanted infiltration into the national unions. This
Note demonstrates that both policy issues can be satisfied in a positive
fashion.
In Sadlowski4 the Court upheld the USWA's constitutional amendment that broadly denied candidates access to outsider contributions.
Broad prohibitions against outsider contributions in union political
campaigns, however, are unreasonable violations of the LMRDA. The
goal of the LMRDA is to further union democracy. Congress recognized that union democracy could best be achieved through free and
fair elections. The realities of union politics show that an inherent imbalance exists between the incumbent and insurgent forces; the insurgent is usually both understaffed and underfinanced. Therefore, a total
prohibition of outside contributions unreasonably perpetuates this imbalance of opportunities.
More reasonable limitations on outside contributions, modeled on
public election restrictions, can be used to protect against unwanted
outside influence but still allow effective challenges by insurgents. Suggested reforms include reporting and disclosure, ceilings on contributions, institutionalized funding and reimbursement, and limitations on
union staff campaign activity.
Craig B. Klosk

108

See supra note 104.

